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Conference Summary
World Health
Organization Global
Conference on Severe
Acute Respiratory
Syndrome
On June 17–18, 2003, in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia, the World Health
Organization (WHO) sponsored a
conference entitled SARS: Where Do
We Go From Here? The purpose of
the conference, which was attended
by over 900 scientific and public
health experts from 43 countries, was
to review available knowledge and
lessons learned and to identify key
priorities for the future. Three overar-
ching questions were addressed: Can
severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) be eradicated? Are current
control measures effective? Are cur-
rent alert and response systems robust
enough?
The first day included summaries
of the history of the epidemic, global,
and regional responses coordinated by
WHO through its headquarters in
Geneva and the Western Pacific
Regional Office in Manila, respec-
tively; and national responses in the
People’s Republic of China (PRC),
including in the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region of PRC,
Singapore, Vietnam, Canada, and
United States. Nine presentations
summarized scientific, clinical, public
health, psychosocial, and communica-
tions aspects of the SARS outbreak.
On the second day, breakout groups
met and presented recommendations
on the topics of epidemiology and
public health, possible role of ani-
mals, environmental issues, modeling
the epidemic, clinical diagnosis and
management, reducing transmission
in healthcare settings, blood safety,
reducing community transmission,
preventing international spread, sur-
veillance and response coordination,
effective communication, and pre-
paredness. Background materials for
the conference, slide presentations at
the plenary sessions (including the
breakout group reports), and the text
of speeches by the Director General of
WHO and other dignitaries are avail-
able on the Web (URL:
www.who.int/csr/sars/conference). 
Beginning in March 2003, after
WHO recognized, through its Global
Outbreak Alert and Response
Network (GOARN), an outbreak of
severe respiratory illness with high
transmissibility in healthcare settings
and international spread through air-
line travel, WHO issued a series of
global alerts, travel advisories, and
recommendations for diagnosis, clini-
cal management, and prevention of
transmission. Evolving information
was discussed by virtual networks of
experts, including virologists, clini-
cians, and epidemiologists. Field
teams composed of staff from
GOARN partners were quickly mobi-
lized to assist affected countries in
enhancing surveillance and contain-
ment measures, which included isolat-
ing cases, implementing strict infec-
tion control measures, identifying and
following-up with contacts, and mak-
ing recommendations to travelers to
prevent international spread.
From a global perspective, the
SARS epidemic demonstrated the
importance of a worldwide surveil-
lance and response capacity to
address emerging microbial threats
through timely reporting, rapid com-
munication, and evidence-based
action. The importance of internation-
al collaboration coordinated by WHO
and the need for partnerships among
clinical, laboratory, public health, and
veterinary communities were empha-
sized. From the national perspective,
lessons learned included the need for
the following: strong political leader-
ship at the highest levels to mobilize
the entire society; speed of action;
improved coordination between
national and district levels in coun-
tries with federal systems; increased
investment in public health; updated
legislation regarding surveillance, iso-
lation, and quarantine measures; and
improved infection control in health-
care and long-term-care facilities and
at borders.
Can SARS Be Eradicated?
The breakout groups concluded
that it is too soon to tell if SARS can
be eradicated, but substantial reasons
for concern exist. Chains of person-
to-person transmission can likely be
terminated, provided no reservoir of
asymptomatic carriers, chronic infec-
tion, or seeding of new settings (e.g.,
Africa) exists.  But if an animal reser-
voir of the SARS coronavirus exists,
as suggested by some studies, eradica-
tion would be very difficult. Fecal
shedding of virus by infected persons
and apparent virus stability in the
environment could pose additional
barriers to eradication, although these
circumstances were not major modes
of transmission in the recent epidem-
ic. Research priorities include better
understanding of the epidemiologic
and virologic parameters of infection
and transmission, including “super-
spreading events”; the possible role of
animals, including host range and fac-
tors leading to emergence; the envi-
ronment; and analysis of the effective-
ness of specific interventions in con-
trolling the epidemic. Additional pri-
orities include standardization of
diagnostic assays and reagents, devel-
opment of a reliable front-line diag-
nostic test for use early in illness;
facilitating the ability to ship diagnos-
tic specimens; and development of
animal models to improve under-
standing of pathogenesis and evolu-
tion of clinical disease and to use in
vaccine development and antiviral
drug testing.
Are Current Control Measures
Effective?
Currently recommended measures
to prevent transmission in healthcare
settings are generally effective when
applied, but require proper infrastruc-1192 Emerging Infectious Diseases • Vol. 9, No. 9, September 2003
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ture, training, and consistent practice.
Infection control capacity and prac-
tice in many healthcare settings need
improvement. A minimum global
level of safe practice (standard pre-
cautions, supplemented by risk-based
precautions) should be established.
Studies are needed to determine opti-
mal protective measures (e.g., type of
mask) and when they should be used.
Appropriate protective measures (e.g.,
isolation facilities and masks fit-test-
ed for individual workers) should be
more widely available. 
Measures to control community
transmission (i.e., outside of health-
care settings) and prevent internation-
al spread require further evaluation.
Such measures include public infor-
mation campaigns, contact tracing
and sometimes quarantine, hotlines to
report fever, temperature screening in
public places, recommendations to
travelers, and entry and exit screening
at borders with questionnaires and
temperature checks. Control measures
in the community would likely have
the greatest yield if focused on links
between healthcare settings and the
wider community, with contact trac-
ing prioritized according to the nature
of exposure, but further evaluation is
needed. Home or institutional quaran-
tines, when used, should ensure finan-
cial and psychosocial support and
daily needs of the affected persons.
Stigmatization of affected persons and
groups was identified as an important
issue. In an attempt to reduce stigma-
tization, one country’s president
reportedly proclaimed quarantined
persons to be “heroes in the nation’s
battle against SARS.” Some partici-
pants stated that visible measures to
control community and international
spread were important in restoring
public and business confidence and as
deterrents, regardless of the yield of
SARS cases detected. 
Are Current Alert and Response
Systems Robust Enough?
Current systems are robust in that
SARS is being controlled, but many
processes are not sustainable because
of limited capacity. Surveillance pri-
orities include developing a sensitive
“alert” case definition in areas at
greatest risk for recurrence, develop-
ing a front-line laboratory diagnostic
test to identify patients with SARS
coronavirus infection during periods
of high incidence of other respiratory
illnesses, improving laboratory diag-
nostic capacity and laboratory-based
surveillance, and developing integrat-
ed information tools that allow real
time analysis of clinical, epidemiolog-
ic, and laboratory data. 
Response coordination priorities
include development of contingency
plans, including ensuring coordina-
tion and surge capacity at global,
regional, and national levels; develop-
ment of laboratory and information
technology systems; and the ongoing
revision of the international health
regulations to focus on containing
emerging infectious diseases. 
Underlying any response is the
need to communicate information in a
transparent, accurate, and timely man-
ner. Effective communication requires
training, understanding, and use of a
range of different media. Developing
further the current communication
systems and our understanding of risk
communication is vital if future out-
breaks are to be controlled quickly
and effectively and the health, eco-
nomic, and psychosocial effects of
major health events are to be mini-
mized.
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